

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- Against -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

DEPONENT: MASAOKI, Jinsaburo

My name is Jinsaburo MASAOKI. I was formerly a General of the Imperial Japanese Army.

I was the Vice-Chief of the General Staff from January 1932 to June 19th 1933, a War Councillor for a short while: the Inspector-General of training from January 1934 to July 16th 1935; a War Councillor again and was then transferred to the first reserve in March 1936.

When I became the Vice-Chief of the General Staff the Chief of the General Staff was H. R. H. the Prince KAN'UN and the War Minister was Lieutenant-General ARAKI Sadao.

When I assumed this post War Minister ARAKI explained to me the internal and external situations of Japan which existed at that time, the gist of which, as far as I remember, was as follows.

"The State of affairs of our country, both internal and external is quite alarming. There have already been many internal incidents and our relation with the League of Nations is far from being satisfactory.

As for Manchuria in spite of the non-expansion policy of the former cabinet, the situation has simply become more aggravated.

As there is every danger that it will develop into a regular war, we must leave no stone unturned in immediate saving of this complicated situation. When I (ARAKI) was appointed Minister of War the CHINCHOU district was in a critical condition. Unless we saved it, our residents and troops would be endangered. The diplomatic negotiations were at a standstill; the situation was aggravated, and the KUANTUNG Army was in a difficulty. The Government, therefore, was obliged to decide to liquidate that district for self-defence and protection of the residents. The General Staff Office ordered the KUANTUNG Army to that effect. The liquidation campaign has just finished. I think there will be no need of further operations unless our Army is challenged. At any rate we will try to cease hostilities within the smallest possible scope. The Government is on principle dealing with Chang Hsuehliang who is still disturbing peace and order. Therefore our scope of operation is limited under any condition within his sphere of influence. Bearing this in mind, please control the Army strictly."

At my appointment, my predecessor told me almost the same thing.

At the time when I assumed the post as the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, Premier INUKAI. While he has explained chiefly our political difficulties that Japan was experiencing at that time, he also made some remarks on the situation which was more or less similar

to that of War Minister ARAKI. The Premier did not in any way suggest that he had any intention of petitioning to the Throne for an Imperial Order, by virtue of which to withdraw all the troops from Manchuria, nor did I ever hear from anyone that Premier INUKAI had any such intention.

I reported to H.R.H. the Prince KAN-IN, Chief of General Staff, what I had heard from the Premier and the War Minister respectively, and with his approval, I managed and conducted the matters in accordance with the Government's policies shown to me by War Minister ARAKI. While I was doing so, it was suddenly decided by the Ministry that troops be dispatched immediately to Shanghai which were requested by navy authorities for the purpose of reinforcing the navy and to protect Japanese nationals there.

Bearing in mind what I had heard from the War Minister I took every precaution to observe his principle so that the dispatched troops would not exceed the scope of their primary object. Divisional Commander UEDA (J.N. - Commander of the dispatched troops) also followed closely this principle and endeavored to settle the situation without resorting to means of bloodshed. I remember he first, made a proclamation requesting reconsideration by the opponent over their action. However, contrary to his expectation, the opponent increased their preparation for fighting and added difficulties. In fact, there were sign that an over all clash between Chinese and Japanese was inevitable.

Under these circumstances, further reinforcement was decided from the point of view of strategic importance with the purpose of solving the situation quickly. When the vanguard of the second reinforcement made their landing at CHIILAIKOU along the YALOWTHERING, the 19 Route Army began to retreat, and as it was driven beyond the expected line, attack was ceased. Thus hostilities ended in three days, with almost negligible casualties.

In due course, an agreement was signed to ensure the future safety.

This agreement provided Japan the right of stationing certain part of her troops there, but in view of War Minister ARAKI's principle, which was completely identical to ours, we decided to evacuate all the troops from China and I think the complete withdrawal was made within a month of signing the agreement. JOHOL and HULUNPEIRH campaigns were and the task of the Kwantung Army through the provisions of the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol and because of constant disturbances of law and order in and around Johol chiefly by TANG YULAN and in HULUNPEIRH chiefly by SU PING WEI, it became necessary for the Japanese and Manchoukuo forces to resort to military action based on the provisions of the Protocol. It took place after the formal recognition of the State of Manchoukuo, and as the precaution was taken throughout the campaign not to divert from the primary principle of bringing about law and order the operation called for extreme difficulties; nevertheless, as to HULUNPEIRH our object was achieved through good offices of the Soviet Union and as to JOHOL efforts were made to limit the action within the line of the Great Wall and observance of this fundamental policy was sternly requested to the troops in the front at the risk of suffering considerable operational inconveniences. There was an occasion when the troops advanced beyond this limit but they were immediately ordered to return and further action was stopped at that. Then the hostilities were finally settled by the conclusion of Tangku Agreement.

I believe that War Minister ARAKI was one of the persons who were most seriously worried about the Manchurian Incident. Because of this worry, he had made a firm determination to settle it, which finally led to the Tangku Agreement. No sooner had the Agreement been signed than he strove to settle the overall situation of Japan by adjusting foreign as well as domestic affairs.

He often told me in those days that he was devoting his effort toward letting the people live up to the original teachings of Japan, enhancing by so doing the virtue of benevolence of His Majesty the Emperor among the people, and externally, toward improving aggravated international relations by realizing the already advocated International Peace Conference.

The natives' wishes for the Independence of Manchukuo were ardent, when I was appointed the Vice-Chief of the General Staff. The General Staff did not on principle interfere with it as it was a political problem. Minister of War ARAKI assumed the most prudent attitude toward it. He was in accordance with the decision of the Government based on the opinion of the Foreign Office and the real situation. During this time the General Staff was devoting itself to security of peace and order there.

The opinion of War Minister ARAKI toward the League of Nations was quite clear. He fully explained his opinion at the cabinet meeting and induced the meeting to the decision that Japan would not withdraw from the League.

I was under the impression that the War Minister had been prepared with an opinion with which he hoped to persuade the League of Nations. It also seemed to me that the War Minister had had a firm belief of getting the complete understanding of powers over Japan's position if once restoration of law and order in Manchuria were attained which he thought above everything else.

War Minister ARAKI stressed importance on quality than on quantity of troops from the viewpoint of armament. He endeavored to recover the armament which had fallen behind since World War I up to that of other Powers at the time of the War. He had his own ideal on national defence, which was all based on morality. He was particularly concerned in promoting the character and moral standard of the commissioned officers.

War Minister ARAKI also exerted to calm the mind of young officers who, indignant at the current situation, had already caused considerable troubles. He did his best to develop the immaculate spirit of those officers without being distorted so that they may devote their unshattered attention to their duty. While devoting his whole hearted attention for this purpose, he also let his subordinates spare no time in teaching and guiding the younger officers, and so they began to show the sign of composure in due course, and at the occasion of May 15th Incident, it turned out that no army commissioned officer participated in it.

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

宣 誓 供 述 書

供 述 者 眞 崎 甚 三 郎

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ヅ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上
次ノ如ク供述致シマス

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RETURN TO ROOM 361

一私は元陸軍大将真崎甚三郎であります。

一私は昭和七年一月十四日より八年六月十九日迄参謀次長を勤め後軍

事参謀官同九年一月より十年七月十六日まで教育總監を勤め其後軍

事参謀官を拜命十一年三月以降備役に編入されました。

一私が参謀次長に就任した時は参謀總長は閑院宮殿下で陸軍大臣は荒

木貞夫中将でありました

一私は参謀と同時に荒木首相より當時の内閣外の情勢に就いて大要左

の意味を話がありました

一現下内閣の形勢は容易でない。国内には多くの不祥事件があり國際

聯盟との關係はよくない、滿洲に關しては前内閣で不祥大方針を誤

明した結果事態は悪化の一路を辿つた。此の儘の状態では進まず日

支の軍事的戦争へ發展する危険があるから萬策を盡して事態を速か

に收拾する必要がある。

一自分、荒木一の大任就任の時は錦州方面は危機に頻して救援をせね

ば、滿洲民も軍も危い有様であり外交交渉は行詰り危険は増し、關

東軍と善しんで居たので政府は已むなく民留民の保護と自衛の爲之

れが必要をするに決したので参謀本部は關東軍に指示し漸く肅正を

終つた筈である。今後は挑戦せられざる限り兵を動かす事もなか

らうと思ふが一つ共に早く小範圍の地域で戦亂を終息する様に努力

したい、又政府は方針として張學良が治安を今尙攪亂して居る有様
 で相手は張學良に限られ従つて其行動範圍も萬已むを得ざる時でも
 彼れの權力支配下の地域を出でてはならないと云ふ事に定められた
 からこれも心に置き嚴肅に軍を統制して貰ひたいと云ふ事であつた
 又就任の際前次長よりも略同一内容の申繼がありました
 私の參謀次長就任當時犬養總理にも會見したが總理は主として我國
 政治上の困難なる立場にある實情を説明され其他は大体荒木陸相の
 話と大差なき話であつた彼の奉勅命令を以て滿洲から撤兵する考を
 持つて居らるゝ様な話は少しも無かりしのみならず斯る話他から
 も聞いた事はなかつた
 私以上陸相及總理の談を其の都度總長殿下に報告し其の御承認を
 得て荒木陸相から傳へられた政府の方針通り處理しつゝあつた時二
 月初め突如海軍の要望と内閣の要求により海軍救済と居留民保護の
 爲上海へ急速派兵する事となつた。遂初から陸相の切なる意見もめ
 り其の意見通り救済目的以外に涉らぬ様充分に注意し植田師團長も
 此の意を体し無阻を以て目的を遂げる様先づ聲明を發し相手の反省
 を求めた。
 然るに相手は却つて準備を加へ作戰上困難を増し稍もすれば日支全
 面衝突となり兼ねない状態となつたので已むを得ず作戰課長に小畑

敏四郎大佐を起用し作戰部の陣容を整へ作戰本位として急速事態收拾を目的として増兵を決せられた。そして第二次増援の先頭兵團揚子江河岸の七了口に上陸するや十九路軍は退却して豫定線外に出たから直ちに停戦直かに三日且つ僅少の死傷を以て作戦は終つた。其後將來の安全の爲協定が出来た。協定には當分一部兵力駐屯の權利があつたが、國相の方針もあり意見全く一致し速かに全部の撤兵をなすこととし協定後一ヶ月以内に全軍を撤退せしめた。

一、ホロンバイル及熱河作戦は日滿協定書に基く關東軍の任務であつてホロンバイルは蘇俄文を熱河は馮玉麟を中心として治安擾亂運動絶えざりし爲、遂に協定書に基く日滿兩軍の作戦となつたのである。當時滿洲國承認後でもあり最初の方針以外に逸脱する事がない爲作戦上は非常なる苦境があつたが、前者は幸ひソ聯の好意に依り、目的を達せざるも長戦に止まることに努力し幾多の作戦上の不利がありしも此の方針を固守軍に示し一度は前進したのを引返さしめ次いで急進に歩調を取らせた協定で兵亂は完全に收拾し得た次第である。二、荒木陸相は滿洲事態を最も心配したる一人であつただけに異常の決意を以て之が收拾に當り遂に塘沽協定成るや直ちに國際調整と國內の整頓をなして全般時局の安定を圖らんと之に着手し國內問題としては日本本來の教へに基き陛下の御仁愛の徳を盛にし外は國際的平

和會議を促進して今日まで悪化せる國際問題を正道に戻らしむる様努力してゐる事を機會ある毎に私にも話して居た。

一、滿洲國獨立の氣運は私が次長に着任した時には現地に於ては相當地方民の熱望が盛んとなつて居た。參謀本部は此の問題は政治問題であるから干渉しない方針をとつてゐた。荒木陸軍大臣も極めて慎重なる態度で全然干渉を避け外務省の意見と現地の實情とに基づき政府の決定に従つて居た。此間參謀本部は唯現地治安の確保に惠念して居た。

一、國際聯盟に對する荒木陸相の考は明瞭で閣議においては十分に説明し脱退もしない事に決り陸相は飽迄も聯盟を説得すべき意見も用意して居た。又陸相は何よりも滿洲の治安回復が第一である。これさへ出来れば國際的にも必ず日本の立場を了解せしめ得ると強く信じて居た。

一、荒木陸相は陸軍の軍備に就いては數量より精兵主義を取り、歐洲大戰後の落伍を回復せしめて大戰當時の型迄追いつかんと努力し國防觀には自己の理想を持ち一切が道義中心であつた。又特に將校の素質向上其の徳性涵養には終始意を用ひて居た。

一、荒木陸相は當時青年將校が、既に時局に憤慨して相當事件を起して荒んで居たから、彼等の氣持を落ち着け其純眞なる性質を歪まない様に一意軍務に従はしめようと最も心を用ひ、陸相固有の純眞を打ち込み時を惜しまず説得せしめて居た。それで何れも次第に落着きをみせ

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五、一五事件には陸軍將校は一人も加はらなかつた。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月二十五日 於市谷極東國際軍事裁判所

供 述 者 眞 崎 甚 三 郎

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同 日 於

立 會 人 蓮 岡 高 明

Def, Doc#1162

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宣
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署名捺印 眞 崎 甚 三 郎